Handling organized labor in the postwar era was a defining issue for the Truman administration. Benefitting from the passage of the Wagner Act which restricted corporations’ ability to interfere with organized labor activities and counting on support from the Democratic administration and congress, labor unions would launch an aggressive campaign of strikes, beginning at war’s end in 1945. This rash of labor activity, however, brought public opinion against the unions and led, in part, to the election of a Republican Congress in 1946. The 80th Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, intended to curb the power of organized labor on matters of national interest. Due to public opinion of labor unions and the skill of Senator Robert Taft in winning support for his bill, Taft-Hartley was supported by conservative Southern Democrats as well as Republicans. Northern Democrats, labor leaders, and President Truman, however, staunchly opposed the bill, which they called the “slave-labor act”. When Taft Hartley passed Congress in 1947, President Truman vetoed it, only to have his veto overridden by the broad support the act had in Congress, due in large part to the pressure of public opinion.
Truman was by no means finished with Taft-Hartley, in spite of Congress’ rebuke. The act became a key issue of the 1948 Presidential election, with Truman using his continued opposition to the measures of Taft-Hartley as a means by which to mobilize organized labor to vote for him in the election. To Truman’s credit, this move to gain union support is considered to be a significant factor in his surprise defeat of Dewey, in spite of division within the Democratic party. Truman and the northern Democrats, however, would take this victory as a mandate, and initiated an ill-fated effort to repeal Taft-Hartley. What emerged was a rolling legislative disaster, as even Republican efforts to amend the bill faltered, ultimately leaving the bill nearly completely intact.
Truman made repealing Taft-Hartley a major point in his 1949 State of the Union address, and immediately put forward a proposal for legislation that would replace Taft-Hartley with a more mildly amended form of the Wagner Act, which became actual legislation in the form of the Lesinski bill. On the Republican side, the Wood bill was created as a counterpoint which would give some small concessions to organized labor while retaining most of Taft-Hartley. In an attempt to gain support for the Lesinski bill, Truman threatened southern Democrats with a withdrawal of support in the coming election if they refused to support this measure. Truman failed, however, while the Wood bill passed the House only to be narrowly blocked by his administration, which chose to keep Taft-Hartley as-is rather than allow a Republican-backed amendment to it.
The debacle surrounding the Taft-Hartley act must be seen as an example of the somewhat inept style of Truman’s government. Multiple times, the Truman Administration grossly overestimated Congressional opposition to Taft-Hartley, and though it must be said that Truman was able to use the issue as effective leverage in gaining union support, Truman’s blunder in assuming that a near-full repeal of Taft-Hartley was possible marks a significant error in his dealings with the Legislative branch, and his campaigning for this relatively hard-line position forced him to opt for keeping Taft-Hartley as is, rather than accept the incremental gains that the Wood bill would have provided at the cost of admitting a Republican victory on the issue.
Aaron, Benjamin. “Amending the Taft-Hartley Act: a Decade of Frustration.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 11.3 (1958): 327–38.
Cullen, Donald E. “The Taft-Hartley Act in National Emergency Disputes.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 7.1 (1953): 15-30.
“That Taft-Hartley Wrangle,” Challenge, March 1953, 16-22.
Harry S.Truman 