Labor Strikes in the United States Post War – Jackie Atkinson

As war began to end, many Americans feared that the country would fall back again into another depression that they were not prepared for. There was then a wave of strikes, layoffs, and demobilization, but fortunately, the unemployment rate did not reach a level in which they would fall into the depression again. Despite the fact that America did not fall back into a depression, Americans refused to give Truman credit. Americans were not adjusting to peace after the war, thus resulting in much dissatisfaction. There were reduced paychecks due to the cut in overtime pay, temporary unemployment, etc. To try to fix the lost satisfaction, Truman created a 21-point program, known as the Fair Deal, but Americans wanted nothing to do with this. The country blatantly ignored Truman’s idea for national health insurance. The New Deal consisted of ways to guarantee full employment, increase insurance for the unemployed, and increase minimum wage by 40 cents, but Americans wanted no part. This is partly due to the fact that the people of the United States no longer wanted to take part in the New Deal, which is where the Fair Deal stemmed from. Harry Truman was a firm believer in the New Deal and hoped that the people who also supported the New Deal would now support the fair deal. This showed how little faith the country had in the president’s ability to lead the country.

There were so many dissatisfied people in the United States that it even caused the men and women returning from war to be frustrated with President Truman. The men and women returning from overseas were so enraged with his new about the slowing of the demobilization that the Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, was burned in effigy. With the return of those overseas, there were many marriages, as well as many divorces. Since there were many new marriages, couples had to look for new homes, which was getting harder and harder to do because of the sudden increase in the need for homes. This shortage of homes was the hardest things for Americans to accept because it reminded many of the Depression, which is not where anyone wanted to go back to. In order for Americans to find a home, they would stay with in-law and even go so far as to convert chicken coops to make-stay living. As living conditions were getting worse, Truman was becoming more concerned with inflation. This is when he became concerned with the wartime price controls.

The problem that then arose was the fact that President Truman disrupted the peacetime economy. There were now new shortages that had really concerned Americans. There was the shortage in radios, cars, clothing, whiskey, and choice cuts of meat. Once these shortages arose, black markets developed and soon the prices that government dictated had no affect on consumers. With the rise of the black markets and increased job loss, strikes became more common. The strikes were unlike those the nation had experienced since the strikes of the Great Depression.

As time continued, Americans found less trust in Truman and his administration. Some of the biggest problems the Unions of the United States were faced with were the minimum wage payments. Since the war was ending, there was a need for more jobs, which meant that the members of the union that were already working were unable to get paid for their overtime work. The more government policy was put to use, the more the members of the unions became dissatisfied. Once Truman’s advisors were able to persuade him to allow leeway on the wages, the unions saw the light and would return to work.

In this situation, the strikes that took place in the United States after war were very influential in Truman’s plan for presiding over the United States. The Americans had some control over President Truman while Truman was still able to maintain his position. Though Truman tried to make changes to government plans, many Americans were not satisfied with the changes or they refused to listen. Because of this, the workers went on strike, which would result in more amendments to plans that Truman and his administration already tried to fix. When this occurred, it took many steps for both Americans and President Truman to both be somewhat satisfied.

Coal Strikes – Jackie Atkinson

As strikes became more popular in the United States, there was an increased tension between the unions and President Truman. Many unions and union workers followed the lead of Walter Reuther, who refused to work until hourly wage increased by 30%. This strike against General Motors lasted for 113 days. After seeing this, the United Mine Workers of America began their own strike, led by John L. Lewis. Although Lewis was loved by the coal miners, most of the other Americans were not fans of him, no exceptions with President Truman. Not to mention he had ordered two walkouts meanwhile the nation was still at war.

Because being on strike was trending in the mid 1940s, the nation’s railway companies were on strike as well. As a result, Truman decided that it was time to use his power in his favor and so he seized both the mines and the railroads. In return, Lewis said “Let Truman dig coals with his bayonets.” The message that was sent to Truman enraged him enough that he wrote a speech that suggested they “hang a few traitors” even though Truman had no intention of reading the speech. Taking action, Truman decided to ask permission “to draft into the Armed Forces of the United States all workers who are on strike against their government.” As this took place, Lewis wrote a message informing Truman that the strike was over, though the House of Representatives still chose to approve Truman’s request. On the other hand, the Senate refused his request, but was still able to receive a wage contract signed by Lewis informing government that the miner’s strike had ended.

This situation is nothing to take lightly. In this case, both the Union workers and Truman and his administration tested their powers and pushed each other to the limit. If plans were carried out, like they could have been, then it would have resulted in many hurt families. President Truman went as far as requesting permission to draft those workers who were on strike to the Armed Forces, it could have resulted in many hurt people because families would lose loved ones in war or their loved ones would not come back from war the same. Even though the Senate denied the request, Americans still lost trust in Truman because it proved that he was willing to take this situation to new limits.

Union workers are also largely at blame in this situation. After seeing the success that Walter Reuther had in his strike against general motors, Lewis took advantage of the situation and began a strike for the coal miners, which would soon spread to the railway systems. The more the unions pushed, the less patience President Truman had. The unions would not budge though, after seeing the success that Reuther had, they knew what the government was capable of, so they knew what had to be done in order to achieve their goals of increasing their pay.

In this case, President Truman and his administration, as well as the Union workers are to blame for the chaos caused by the strikes. For both parties, a great deal of trust had been lost, which could have been easily avoided. Americans are known to be greedy and this is a prime example of how the people of the United States wanted more money. Although for some families, the families really did need more money, others were doing it because of the great success that they knew Reuther had, which was not helping the government. And, Truman and his administration did not handle this in such a way that later forms of government should look to as a model.

Truman’s administration and the union workers should not have handled this is such the manner that they did. It created such a problem for the United States that the bond of trust that Truman had with the people of the United States was broken. When this occurs, it is important to know that there are always two sides to the story and that in no way, should the union workers be let off the hook. The two groups acted in such a way that hurt the economy more than it helped.

Truman and the Taft-Hartley Act – Martin Fronius

Handling organized labor in the postwar era was a defining issue for the Truman administration. Benefitting from the passage of the Wagner Act which restricted corporations’ ability to interfere with organized labor activities and counting on support from the Democratic administration and congress, labor unions would launch an aggressive campaign of strikes, beginning at war’s end in 1945. This rash of labor activity, however, brought public opinion against the unions and led, in part, to the election of a Republican Congress in 1946. The 80^th Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, intended to curb the power of organized labor on matters of national interest. Due to public opinion of labor unions and the skill of Senator Robert Taft in winning support for his bill, Taft-Hartley was supported  by conservative Southern Democrats as well as Republicans. Northern Democrats, labor leaders, and President Truman, however, staunchly opposed the bill, which they called the “slave-labor act”. When Taft Hartley passed Congress in 1947, President Truman vetoed it, only to have his veto overridden by the broad support the act had in Congress, due in large part to the pressure of public opinion.

Truman was by no means finished with Taft-Hartley, in spite of Congress’ rebuke. The act became a key issue of the 1948 Presidential election, with Truman using his continued opposition to the measures of Taft-Hartley as a means by which to mobilize organized labor to vote for him in the election. To Truman’s credit, this move to gain union support is considered to be a significant factor in his surprise defeat of Dewey, in spite of division within the Democratic party. Truman and the northern Democrats, however, would take this victory as a mandate, and initiated an ill-fated effort to repeal Taft-Hartley. What emerged was a rolling legislative disaster, as even Republican efforts to amend the bill faltered, ultimately leaving the bill nearly completely intact.

Truman made repealing Taft-Hartley a major point in his 1949 State of the Union address, and immediately put forward a proposal for legislation that would replace Taft-Hartley with a more mildly amended form of the Wagner Act, which became actual legislation in the form of the Lesinski bill. On the Republican side, the Wood bill was created as a counterpoint which would give some small concessions to organized labor while retaining most of Taft-Hartley. In an attempt to gain support for the Lesinski bill, Truman threatened southern Democrats with a withdrawal of support in the coming election if they refused to support this measure. Truman failed, however, while the Wood bill passed the House only to be narrowly blocked by his administration, which chose to keep Taft-Hartley as-is rather than allow a Republican-backed amendment to it.

The debacle surrounding the Taft-Hartley act must be seen as an example of the somewhat inept style of Truman’s government. Multiple times, the Truman Administration grossly overestimated Congressional opposition to Taft-Hartley, and though it must be said that Truman was able to use the issue as effective leverage in gaining union support, Truman’s blunder in assuming that a near-full repeal of Taft-Hartley was possible marks a significant error in his dealings with the Legislative branch, and his campaigning for this relatively hard-line position forced him to opt for keeping Taft-Hartley as is, rather than accept the incremental gains that the Wood bill would have provided at the cost of admitting a Republican victory on the issue.

Aaron, Benjamin. “Amending the Taft-Hartley Act: a Decade of Frustration.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 11.3 (1958): 327–38.

Cullen, Donald E. “The Taft-Hartley Act in National Emergency Disputes.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 7.1 (1953): 15-30.

“That Taft-Hartley Wrangle,” Challenge, March 1953, 16-22.

Economic Reconversion: WPB, OPA, and Truman – Martin Fronius

At the end of the Second World War, a major question facing the United States was how the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy should be carried out. Allocation of resources and products during the war had been administered by the War Production Board, while the Office of Price Administration was responsible for maintaining prices and avoiding inflation or deflation. As the war drew to a close and the debate over reconversion began, WPA chief Julius Krug advocated following the advice of business leaders who wanted controls removed as quickly as possible to maximize their output and profits. The OPA, headed by Chester Bowles, took a contrary position, arguing that a rapid removal of economic controls would lead to scarcity of resources for small and low-cost manufacturers while risking inflation. Krug took the initiative after V-E day, lifting 130 of his organization’s controls within weeks.

As Krug continued to remove controls against the wishes of the OPA, Bowles decided to take the conflict to President Truman himself. Truman agreed with Bowles’ case that the WPA’s removal of controls threatened the price stabilization efforts of the OPA, He overturned Krug’s removal of controls, giving him a four-point plan for a more gradual transition. Krug, however, disregarded this statement, and used portions of Truman’s rebuke as vindication for his program. Truman, still occupied with the war against Japan, did not interfere with this insubordination. It was with the removal of Order L-41 (which had restricted housing prices through controls on building materials) that Truman was forced to act. Upon the removal of this measure, housing prices increased drastically within days, leading Truman to restore material allocation restrictions by the end of 1945.

By that time, the WPB had given way to the Civilian Production Administration, led by John Small, who followed the policies of Krug before him. The result of these policies was a shortage of low-priced goods, as material producers favored selling to high-priced manufacturers, and an expansion of large enterprises at the expense of small producers. This outcome led to escalating inflation and shortages of many raw materials and consumer goods, for which the blame would fall on Truman and Bowles. The OPA, unable to combat rising prices, effectively became obsolete by 1946, and the President’s popularity would suffer.

In fact, Truman was not directly responsible for the disorderly removal of wartime controls that led to the very visible economic issues following the war, but his inaction in controlling members of his administration, most notably Krug, must be considered a failure on his part. Though the process of reconversion was by no means an easy one, the factionalism which prevailed among the agencies handling it certainly did not help matters, factionalism which could have been stemmed by more decisive intervention on Truman’s part.

Bernstein, Barton J. “The Removal of War Production Board Controls on Business, 1944-1946.” The Business History Review 39.2 (1965): 243-60.

Truman the Candiate: 1948 – Martin Fronius

In the election of 1948, all signs could have been seen to point to a Republican victory. The Democratic incumbent, Harry Truman, was in dire straits-his administration was unpopular in the country as a whole, and to compound the problem, the Progressive and Dixiecrat splinter parties robbed him of potential supporters. With a fractured, unenthused party, it would have been easy to conclude that Truman stood no chance of victory. Not to be discouraged, Truman launched a brilliant campaign that would ultimately succeed in tipping the scales very slightly in his favor.

Truman’s political advisors wisely selected the key to his campaign-winning the New Deal coalition of liberal intellectuals, urban blacks, laborers, and farmers. Targeting these groups would undercut the Progressive Party’s ability to take Democratic votes. Truman courted these votes by touting his commitment to the New Deal and programs for the poor and underprivileged. To win over black voters, Truman put forward a civil rights program that would win him votes in key states, including California.

In courting the farm vote, Truman emphasized the generally good market for crops, from which farmers profited. He emphasized his administration’s extensive programs to benefit farmers, including soil conservation and rural education. Knowing this was a typically Republican voting bloc, Truman campaigned vigorously for it, and also used negative campaigning to full effect. By rightly claiming that the Republicans proposed doing away with many pro-farm programs, he was able to rob his competitor, Dewey, of a key support base.

What Truman himself considered most important, however, was his courting of the labor vote. During the 1946 mid-term election, many laborers had not voted, disapproving of Truman’s actions against strikes but even more wary of the Republicans. Truman was able to trumpet his veto of the Taft-Hartley Act, overridden though it was, and by joining labor leaders in calling it a “slave-labor act” and promising to repeal it, Truman won the labor vote in droves, giving him a big advantage over Dewey in many urban centers. Getting out the labor vote had a second effect-congressional seats lost to the Republicans in ’46 were also returned to Democratic hands in large numbers.

Overall, Harry Truman was a superb Presidential candidate in 1948, one who was able to unite diverse groups into a coalition behind him. In spite of all the factors running against him, Truman was able to campaign far more energetically than his opponent, which all told had a significant effect of its own.

Bernard Lemelin, “The U.S. Presidential Election of 1948: The Causes of Truman’s “Astonishing” Victory.” Revue française d’études américaines, 87 (2001), 38-60.

Truman and the Dismissal of MacArthur – Martin Fronius

In April 1951, President Truman dismissed General Douglas MacArthur, due to a considerable and sustained disagreement on the conduct of the Korean War, as well as public statements contradictory to the administration’s stance. Truman’s firing of MacArthur would have considerable domestic repercussions, given MacArthur’s status in the mindset of the American public. General MacArthur was one of the great heroes of World War II, and consequently, Truman would face considerable public opposition for his dismissal. Truman’s grounds for the firing were that MacArthur, through his statements was disrespecting the office of the President, which constitutes insubordination for any military officer.

Even so, the dismissal of MacArthur was a considerable political risk for Truman. Although his grounds for the dismissal have been found constitutional, the real issue would be the public’s response. It was of the utmost importance for Truman to present his case in a way that the American people would be willing to accept and, if possible, to turn the tables on the popular MacArthur. Given the situation, Halford Ryan considers the most important point for the President to convey was the exact reason for his firing of MacArthur, thereby tackling the issue head-on. Conversations indicate that Truman did, in fact, want to confront the issue this way. However, his Secretary of State, Dean Acheson was insistent that the speech should emphasize the administration’s policy in Korea, which would promote Acheson’s ideas while avoiding the issue of MacArthur entirely. Truman quite wisely requested a rewrite of the speech which included the firing of MacArthur, though Acheson’s influence meant it was not the main point of the speech. As a result, though the radio address did seem to increase support for Truman’s side, it failed to truly win public support for his action. However, in this case, this does not truly reflect negatively on Truman.

In fact, his decision to fire MacArthur in the first place shows considerable resolve: knowing full well what the political consequences might be, Truman did not hesitate in dealing with MacArthur,

Harry S Truman: A Misdirected Defense for MacArthur’s Dismissal

Halford Ross Ryan

Presidential Studies Quarterly , Vol. 11, No. 4, Presidential Management: The Importance of Presidential Skills (Fall, 1981), pp. 576-582